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The Simple Analytics of Trade Creation and Diversion

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Firms, Workers, and Policies

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To Willi

- Known since his year at Michigan in the 1980s
- Visited him and Gabi in Essen, Linz, and Tübingen
- Have admired his work throughout
- Delighted to be here to honor him

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My Topic

• FTAs

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• Willi has touched on these throughout his career, as have most of us in the trade field



Outline

- Background
- 3-country case, in graphs
- Somewhat more general case, in equations
- 4-country case, in graphs

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Background

- Viner's (1950) trade creation and trade diversion are usually illustrated with
 - Constant costs
 - 2-country FTA or CU plus rest of world
- We'll look here at cases with
 - Upward sloping supplies
 - And in the last case, an FTA with pre-existing other FTA



For

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3-country case*

- Three countries, importer A, and exporters B, and C
- Export supply and import demands are linear
- Countries B and C are identical
- Two equilibria
 - 0: MFN specific tariff t on exports of both B and C
 - 1: FTA of A and B:
 - tariff t on exports of C;
 - zero tariff on exports of B

*Much of this is an elaboration of material in World Trade Organization, "Causes and Effects of PTAs: Is it all about preferences?", Ch. C: *World Trade Report 2011*, pp. 92-121.





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MFN Equilibrium



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FTA Equilibrium



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TC & TD, another View



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Welfare Effects on Country A **Export Supplies** Import Market $p_{\mathbf{L}}^{A}$ Net gain of A's p^{A} Tariff revenue X^{Bt}, X^{Ct} X^{Bf}, X^{Cf} private sector $X^{Bt} + X^{Ct}$ lost from B p_0^A $+ X^{Ct}$ p_1^A \mathcal{M}^A t a^B ТС $= a^{C}$ $X_1^C X_0^B$ X_1^B Q $M_0^A M_1^A$ Q $= X_0^C$

See immediately that country A

- Gains from trade creation
- Loses from trade diversion
- As well as from lost revenue from country B



Welfare Effects on Countries B and C









These add up, with much cancellation to yield the following:





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Welfare Effects on the World **Export Supplies** Import Market $p^A_{\scriptscriptstyle \rm I\!\!I}$ p^A X^{Bt}, X^{Ct} X^{Bf}, X^{Cf} $X^{Bt} + X^{Ct}$ p_0^A X^{Bf} $+ X^{Ct}$ p_1^A \mathcal{M}^A t a^B TC $= a^{c}$ $\begin{array}{l} X_1^C X_0^B \\ = X_0^C \end{array}$ X_1^B Q $M_0^A M_1^A$ Q

These add up, with much cancellation to yield the following:





These add up, with much cancellation to yield the following:

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These add up, with much cancellation to yield the following:



Welfare Effects on the World



These add up, with much cancellation to yield the following:



Welfare Effects on the World







Why the Loss from Trade Diversion





- Loss is an area, product of the price change and the quantity of trade diversion, with the latter depending on the former.
- So the loss rises with the <u>square</u> of trade diversion.



- Four countries:
 - Importer A
 - Exporters B, C, and D
- Export supply and import demands are linear
- Three equilibria
 - 0: MFN tariff t on exports of B, C, and D
 - 1: FTA of A and D:
 - Tariff t on exports of B and C;
 - Zero tariff on exports of D
 - 2: FTA of A with B, keeping FTA with D
 - Tariff t on exports of C only
 - Zero tariff on exports of B and D
- Consider only cases with $X^i > 0, i = B, C, D$



Exports:

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$$X^{i} = b^{i} (p^{i} - a^{i}), \qquad i = B, C, D, \qquad p^{i} \ge a^{i}$$

Imports:

$$M^A = b^A (a^A - p^A), \qquad p^A \leq a^A$$

Equilibrium:

 $M^A = X^B + X^C + X^D$



Let:

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$$\beta = b^{A} + b^{B} + b^{C} + b^{D}$$

$$\theta^{i} = b^{i}/\beta$$

$$\gamma = \theta^{A}a^{A} + \theta^{B}a^{B} + \theta^{C}a^{C} + \theta^{D}a^{D}$$

Then solution is: $p^{A} = \gamma + \theta^{B}t^{B} + \theta^{C}t^{C} + \theta^{D}t^{D}$

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- With more assumptions, *bⁱ* are proportional to country size
 - (See paper)
- Therefore θ^i is country *i*'s share of world economy
 - (This is not really right, as it assumes both demanders and suppliers in proportion to population. Exporters will in fact have more firms, and thus greater weight, than importers.)

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Effect of new FTA between A and B (in presence of A's FTA with D) Let Δ be change from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 2 $\Delta p^A = -\theta^B t$

Thus price in A falls by a fraction of the tariff, in proportion to size of new partner compared to world. Country B's price rises by the rest of the tariff $\Delta p^B = (1 - \theta^B)t$

Because A's tariff on C and D does not change $\Delta p^{C} = \Delta p^{D} = \Delta p^{A} = -\theta^{B}t$

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From the price changes, one derives the following changes in quantities of trade:

 $\Delta M^A = \theta^B b^A t > 0$

 $\Delta X^B = \theta^B (b^A + b^C + a^D) t > 0$

 $\Delta X^C = -\theta^B b^C t < 0$

 $\Delta X^D = -\theta^B b^D t < 0$

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As must be from market equilibrium

 $\Delta X^B = \Delta M^A - \Delta X^C - \Delta X^D$

Thus the added exports of the partner country include the new imports of country A plus the reduced exports of countries C and D. The latter trade may be said to be "diverted," but we label $-\Delta X^{C}$ as "trade diversion"

and

 $-\Delta X^D$ as "trade reversion"

because it is <u>reversal</u> of trade diversion from the prior FTA.

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Thus

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Trade Creation = $TC = \theta^B b^A t > 0$

Trade Diversion = $TD = \theta^B b^C t > 0$

Trade Reversion = $TR = \theta^B b^D t > 0$



Lost tariff

The Model

Welfare effects of new FTA

Country A (home): $\Delta W^{A} = (M_{0}^{A}/b^{A} + \theta^{B} t/2)TC - tTD - tX_{0}^{B}$

Country B (new partner): $\Delta W^{B} = \Delta NS^{B} = \left[X_{0}^{B} + \frac{1}{2}(TC + TD + TR)\right](1 - \theta^{B})t$ Country C (outside world): $\Delta W^{C} = \left[-X_{0}^{C} + \frac{TD}{2}\right]\theta^{B}t$ Country D (old partner): $\Delta W^{D} = \left[-X_{0}^{D} + \frac{TR}{2}\right]\theta^{B}t$



Welfare effects of new FTA on the World

World (A+B+C+D):

$$\Delta W^W = \frac{1}{2}TCt + \frac{1}{2}(TR - TD)t$$



4-country case

- Three countries, importer A, and exporters B, C, and D
- Export supply and import demands are linear
- Countries B, C, and D are identical
- Two equilibria

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- 1: MFN tariff t on exports of both B and C
 - Zero tariff on exports of old FTA partner D
- 2: New FTA of A and B:
 - tariff t on exports of C only;
 - zero tariff on exports of two FTA partners B and D

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Export Supplies



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Equilibrium 1: A has FTA with 1 country, D







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Changes in Trade from expanding FTA to Country B



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Trade Creation (TC), Diversion (TD), and Reversion (TR)



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Trade Creation (TC), Diversion (TD), and Reversion (TR)



Note that ΔX^B , while a gain to Country B, is the sum of *TC*, *TD*, & *TR*, since $\Delta X^B = \Delta M^A - \Delta X^C - \Delta X^D$

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Note that trade reversion does not appear to affect A's welfare. I suspect this is an artifact of making export supplies from B and D the same.



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Welfare Effect on Country C



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Welfare Effect on Country D







I claim that these gains and losses mostly cancel out to reduce to the following:

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Welfare Effects on World







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4-country case

• Result:

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- World welfare rises with second FTA, by amount depending on trade creation and the tariff
- Recall from model:

$$\Delta W^W = \frac{1}{2}TCt + \frac{1}{2}(TR - TD)t$$

• Here, because we've assumed countries B and D are the same, *TR=TD*

$$\Delta W^W = \frac{1}{2}TCt$$



4-country case

- In general, $TR \neq TD$
- Which is larger depends just on country size, size both face the same price change.

$$\Delta W^W = \frac{1}{2}TCt + \frac{1}{2}(TR - TD)t$$

- If the new partner is smaller than the old, TR > TD, and world gain will be larger
- If new partner is bigger than old, then *TR* < *TD* and world gain will be smaller and perhaps a loss.

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Conclusion

- Analysis of FTAs shouldn't treat each independently of FTAs that already exist
- Sequencing of FTAs can matter.

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